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 ‘Fighting for Their Rights Too’: Military Mutinies and Civilian Protests in 
Burkina Faso 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
In Burkina Faso in 2011, military mutinies followed widespread civilian protests, 
indicating a crisis of confidence for President Compaoré. Through an in-depth look at 
the events, this research encourages an understanding of military revolts that extends 
beyond the military. Although the mutineers never united with the demonstrators, their 
grievances mirrored those of the civilians. The article puts the revolts into a historic 
context and shows a pattern of interconnectedness between military revolts and civilian 
demonstrations in Burkina Faso. The work draws on interviews conducted with military 
personnel and civilians involved in the widespread protests. 
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Introduction 
 
Burkina Faso, a country that rarely makes major headlines, became a focal point 
of international news in October 2014.  Hundreds of thousands of Burkinabé took to the 
streets to express their objection to a proposed constitutional change, which would 
extend presidential term limits.  President Compaoré had already been in power for 
twenty-seven years at this point and extended term limits were seen as synonymous with 
an extension of his regime.  Demonstrations and tension rose daily in the lead up to the 
National Assembly vote to amend the constitution on October 30st.  
The military responded inconsistently to the growing masses.  Most soldiers retreated 
when crowds arrived at the National Assembly, which suggested they supported the 
protest or at least were unwilling to actively counter it.  Yet at demonstrations near the 
Presidential Palace and the residence of the president’s brother, the Presidential Guards 
 3 
(Régiment de Sécurité Présidentiel or RSP) opened fire on unarmed civilians, killing 
between 19-33 demonstrators.1 Confusion within the military regarding how to respond 
to the situation was further seen at the top levels of the hierarchy when two different 
officers declared themselves Head of State. Following international pressure to have a 
civilian lead the transition, Michael Kafando was selected as President, while LtCol Zida 
was appointed Prime Minister until elections were to be held in October 2015Less than a 
month before the election date, members of the privileged Presidential Guards 
obstructed the transitional process by taking hostage the President and Prime Minister.  
Similar to 2014, civilians responded to this elite political interference with mass 
demonstrations.  Long-standing divisions within the military culminated in 2015 when 
the regular army attacked the RSP to force a surrender.     
The events in 2014 and 2015 spotlighted the importance of the military in 
Burkina Faso’s political landscape, as well as their ambiguous relationship with civilian 
society. This article will highlight another recent example of the complex civil-military 
relationship in Burkina Faso through the case of the 2011 crisis.  This crisis involved 
widespread civilian protests followed by the largest mutinies the country has ever seen.  
The events in 2011 demonstrate a pattern of interdependence between military revolts 
and mass demonstrations in Burkina Faso.  In many ways the actions in 2011 
foreshadowed what was to come in 2014-2015.  
The article draws on research conducted in 2012 in Ouagadougou, Bobo 
Dioulasso, and Po.  It involved interviews with both officers and enlisted soldiers in the 
Burkina Faso Army and Air Force.2 Interviews were also conducted with civilians 
involved in or with intimate knowledge of the 2011 protests.  These included leaders of 
labour unions, journalists, academics, human rights activists, and students, along with 
casual conversations with individuals living in the urban centres.  
This research encourages an understanding of military revolts that extends 
beyond the military.  There is a tendency in political science and military studies to 
perpetuate an ‘illusion’ that armies are ‘separate from the societies over which they are 
imposed.’3 This pattern is also seen in studies of mutinies, which regularly focus on the 
material demands of soldiers with limited attention to wider society.4  This case study of 
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mutinies in Burkina Faso counters the trend by emphasizing the interconnectedness of 
soldiers and civilians.  This is done through an in-depth look at mutinies in 2011 as well 
as through a historical contextualization of military revolts in earlier decades. 
 The mutinies in 2011 took place alongside mass protests, however the protestors 
and soldiers never directly united. On the surface this may further emphasize the gap 
between civilians and soldiers.  Yet closer examination of the events in Burkina Faso 
reveals a more complex situation.  The complaints of mutinying soldiers often mirrored 
the grievances of the protestors, suggesting that the soldiers were drawing some of their 
inspiration from the demonstrations.  Interviews with soldiers show that many of the 
tensions that provoked mass protests were also applicable to the military as an 
institution. The same concerns around corruption, injustice, and inequality that were the 
centre of civilian mass protests were also at the forefront of military mutinies.  
The case of overlapping mass protests and mutinies, as seen in Burkina Faso in 
2011, also contributes to further understanding the complex dynamics of popular 
protests. The military’s uprisings alongside protests is a valuable example that ‘protests 
occur in a convoluted and tension-ridden social reality…fraught with antagonisms and 
limited by contradictions.’5 The mutinying soldiers often demonstrated an antagonistic, 
and at times violent, relationship with protestors. Yet their own demands were likely 
motivated by the demonstrations.  Some of the calls of the mutineers were directly 
contradictory to the demands of the protestors but the soldiers’ actions also elicited a 
much quicker response from the government than when the civilians alone took to the 
streets.  Many of the government’s immediate response to the widespread uprising, such 
as increases to food subsidies and decreases in some taxes, benefitted both civilians and 
soldiers. While the mutineers and protestors did not join forces, an understanding of the 
mass protests would be incomplete without taking into account the actions of the 
mutineers.  Similarly, the mutiny must be contextualized alongside the civilian 
demonstrations.  
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A Temporary Civilian-Military Union 
 
  ‘Our country is the champion of the coup d’état’ exclaimed the editorial chief of 
a major radio station in Ouagadougou, and he was not exaggerating.6 According to 
Powell and Thyne’s coup dataset there have been seven successful coups and one failed 
coup attempt since Burkina Faso gained independence from France in 1960.7  The heavy 
involvement of the military in politics is reflected in the fact that all Heads of State 
between 1966 and 2014 had a military background. In addition to the power grabs at the 
top levels of the hierarchy, the Burkinabé military has also had its fair share of mutinies. 
Mutiny can be defined as an act of collective insubordination for goals other than 
political power.  They generally involve mostly rank and file solders expressing their 
grievances to senior hierarchy or political leadership. By focusing on the mutinies in 
Burkina Faso, this article is also a study of the junior ranks, a group that has often been 
excluded in research on African militaries.  
 Until 2011, the most well known mutiny in Burkina Faso occurred in the 
southern city of Po in 1983.  The incident was sparked by the arrest of Captain Thomas 
Sankara, a popular and revolutionary figure, over charges of treason.8  Upon hearing of 
his arrest, the soldiers in Po, led by Sankara’s close friend Captain Blaise Compaoré, 
took control of the city, including police and customs stations and cut telephone 
communication to the capital.  The mutineers set up roadblocks and held control of the 
city for two months. Reports from the time claim the atmosphere was tense but there 
does not appear to have been any violence.  The soldiers were clear in their demands; 
they wanted an unconditional release of their comrade, Captain Sankara.9  
 At the same time that the commandos were mutinying in Po, students throughout 
the country were protesting on the street for Sankara’s release.10  The government gave 
in and released Sankara although still kept him under a loosely-defined house arrest.  
However, this did not prove to be the end of the saga and tension between the 
government and Sankara, along with his many followers (both military and civilian), 
continued.  Soon after the Po mutiny, the military overthrew President Ouedraogo and in 
his place established a ruling council called the Conseil National de la Révolution 
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(CNR), headed by Sankara.11  The civilian involvement in demanding the release of 
Sankara and later supporting the coup, led Sankara to claim the overthrow of Ouedraogo 
was a popular revolution, not a simple military coup.12   
The civilian and military sectors developed a close relationship during this 
period. Sankara made efforts to break down the barriers between the civilian population 
and the military, encouraging soldiers to integrate with civilians.  They assisted with the 
local harvesting, had joint football teams and formed an orchestra together.13 Sankara 
and the CNR made an effort to change the way the military was viewed by the 
population, as well as the way the military viewed its own role.  Whereas traditionally 
the military in Burkina Faso (and elsewhere in the region) was seen as an extension of 
an often unpopular regime, Sankara argued that they should be a ‘component of the 
people’.14   He publicly stated  
the new soldier must live and suffer among the people to which he 
belongs.  The days of the free-spending army are over.  From now on, 
besides handling arms, the army will work in the fields and raise cattle 
sheep and poultry.  It will build schools and health clinics and ensure 
their functioning.15   
 
Most military leaders who come to power in a coup make attempts to win the 
military over with added equipment, salaries, or prestige but instead Sankara in a way 
“demoted” the military to civilian roles.  Furthermore, during this period the military 
became “juniorized”, giving unprecedented power and influence to the junior ranks. This 
shift had a structural element to it as well.  During Sankara’s rule there was compulsory 
retirement for all Generals, leaving the command structure void of the senior positions.16 
The shared grievances between civilians and military as well as the empowerment of 
junior ranks over their seniors are traits seen in the 2011 mutinies. 
 Sankara and the CNR had plenty of critics at home and abroad and the 
implementation of their program was not without fault.  The revolutionary ideas of 
Sankara never truly came to fruition and sections of the military can be seen to have 
killed the revolutionary spirit, both figuratively and literally.  In 1987, less than four 
years after coming to power, Sankara was assassinated.  It is widely believed that 
Compaoré, Sankara’s closest ally, was responsible for the order to kill Sankara.   
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The harmonious relationship between civilians and military that Sankara initially 
envisioned did not last, and it would be inaccurate to claim that there is an exceptionally 
strong civil military relationship in Burkina Faso.  Instead, it is more realistic to say that 
the two have a complex relationship and one in which there is a history of linkages 
between civilian and military movements, particularly at the lower economic class level. 
Although youths today, including junior ranks of the military, were not alive when 
Sankara was in power, he still holds an important place for many Burkinabé.17  His 
image, always in a military uniform and his iconic red beret, can be seen on a regular 
basis in Ouagadougou and was carried through the streets during protests in 2011, 2014, 
and 2015.  
 
 
A Tested Tactic  
 
With the death of Sankara, Compaoré became president.  He retired his fatigues 
and was elected as a civilian in 1991, 1998, 2005, and 2010.  His numerous wins should 
not be mistaken for overwhelming popularity.  Under Compaoré there were restrictions 
on opposition parties and voter turn out in presidential elections was low.18  Despite 
Compaoré’s military background and his history of leading military upheavals (both the 
mutiny in 1983 and coups in 1983 and 1987), he has not been able to keep the military 
satisfied. Soldiers in Burkina Faso have used mutinies as a means of expressing their 
dissatisfaction on a fairly regular basis since the late 1990s.  
In July 1999 soldiers who returned from Central African Republic after 
participating in the MINURCA peacekeeping mission staged a protest over unpaid 
mission subsidies.19 The protest quickly spread beyond the peacekeepers to other 
garrisons throughout the country and these soldiers added complaints about living 
allowances. They accused senior officers of embezzling the funds that were meant for a 
military housing project.20 NCOs were used as liaisons between the protesting soldiers 
and the military hierarchy and the soldiers were paid at least part of the amount they 
demanded.21  The 1999 revolts were similar to the events in 2011 because they occurred 
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amidst ongoing demonstrations by civilians over the suspected murder of journalist 
Nobert Zongo by government forces.22 
 There were also mutinies by soldiers in 2003, 2006, and 2007.  The incident in 
2006 was the most threatening of this series.  The revolt started as a conflict between 
police and soldiers in Ouagadougou but quickly escalated to widespread revolts. A week 
after the incident began the soldiers met with the Ministry of Defense and demanded 
improvements to the accommodations, welfare allowances, and uniforms.23 Burkinabé 
Colonel Nombre argues that soldiers were never penalized for their participation in these 
events and there were never serious assessments conducted to determine the root causes 
of the mutinies.  He suggests that the problems extend beyond the material realm and 
recommends major military restructuring was needed to address the growing 
dissatisfaction.24  However it does not appear that significant changes were made in the 
military and less than a year later another revolt broke out. A commission was set up and 
led by President Compaoré’s brother, to negotiate between the soldiers and senior 
military leadership and resulted in the mutineers receiving part of their demands.25  The 
events in 2011 should be viewed in the context of these series of mutinies.  Soldiers 
were likely emboldened by the immediate material success of their past revolts but also 
still dissatisfied that the larger issues, such as corruption and favouritism, went 
unaddressed.  
 
 
Familiar Dissatisfaction Reignited  
 
 The military mutinies of 2011 were directly proceeded by and overlapped with 
the largest civilian demonstrations seen in Burkina Faso since at least 1998-1999.26  
During interviews in Burkina Faso, locals referred to the mutinies and civilian 
demonstrations collectively as ‘the 2011 crisis.’  The civilian side of this crisis began 
with protests following the arrest and death of a student named Justin Zongo in 
Koudougou in late February 2011. The government made an official statement claiming 
that Zongo died in custody of meningitis, while rumours that he was beaten to death by 
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police quickly spread.  Students throughout the country were outraged that no one was 
charged with Zongo’s death.  Within two weeks, the protests spread to dozens of cities 
throughout the country.   
 As the protests escalated so did the scope of the grievances.  It was no longer just 
about the perceived injustice of the Zongo case but about other suspected murders that 
had not been accounted for.  Chrysogone Zougmore, President of Burkina Faso’s main 
human rights organization, MBDHP, said ‘the crisis was one of years of injustice.’27 
Hamidou Idogo, editor and chief of Journal du Jeudi, expressed a similar opinion by 
stating ‘here in our country we don’t trust authorities anymore.  There is crime in every 
domain and no justice.’28  
In addition to the issue of injustice, labour unions, civil society groups, and 
individuals began to protest high costs of living and low wages, a grievance that much of 
the country could relate to.  The demonstrations grew in size, location, and grievance, 
with various groups expressing loosely related complaints regarding the state of affairs 
in Burkina Faso.  Farmers in Bobo Dioulasso demonstrated their anger at low cotton 
prices, while students in Koudougou took to the streets over police repression, teachers 
in Gaoua demanded higher living allowances and unions in Ouagadougou organized a 
march calling for an increase in public sector salaries.29  
Tensions rose along with the grievances and the protests turned destructive. 
Heavy handed police responses led to civilian injuries and deaths, further incensing the 
protesters. Police stations, government buildings, and the ruling party headquarters were 
vandalized and some set on fire by angry mobs.  The targets of destruction were a clear 
symbol that the demonstrators placed the blame on the government. Despite the 
widespread nature of the protests, the various demonstrations remained fragmented.  
There were common themes in their calls but no unified alliance or demands.30  
   
 
The Military Joins 
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The situation in Burkina Faso went from bad to worse when after a month of 
civilian protests, the military started their own demonstrations.  The initial cause of the 
military mutinies was not directly related to the initial cause of the civilian crisis, 
although both shared complaints about the justice system.  Just as the civilian 
demonstrations quickly added grievances and participants, so did the military revolts.  
As the mutinies grew, one trait that remained consistent was that all participants were 
amongst the enlisted ranks. 
The initial mutiny was sparked by soldiers’ objections to a court ruling.  A group 
of five junior soldiers based in Ouagadougou were arrested after they allegedly beat and 
publicly humiliated a man who they accused of having inappropriate contact with the 
wife of a deployed soldier.   When the soldiers were given sentences ranging from 
fifteen to eighteen months in jail, their fellow soldiers took to the streets, firing their 
weapons in the air and eventually looting local shops in protest of the sentencing.   
  In interviews with Burkinabé soldiers, they explained that this unit was angry 
about the sentencing for two main reasons.  The first is that they simply felt it was not 
deserved.  They commented that the soldiers felt they were defending the honour of their 
colleague’s wife and noted that any respectable man would agree with them.  The 
second reason, and what one source called ‘the most important reason,’ was that the rank 
and file soldiers felt they were being unfairly punished due to their low rank.31  One 
interviewee explained, ‘the guys had assumed that the higher officers would speak out 
on their behalf and they did not.’32  Another provided a similar account by stating ‘they 
were angry at their senior officers for not stepping in.’33  
Soldiers explained that the mutineers were not only resentful that they were 
punished but also alleged that officers had done much worse in the past without having 
been charged. 34 For example, several different military sources told a story about an 
officer who had shot his wife and was simply moved to another base rather than charged 
with a criminal offense. Here the mutinying soldiers made similar accusations as the 
civilians by claiming that the law was selective. The soldiers never outright mentioned 
being inspired by the Justin Zongo case, but the movement likely fuelled the accusations 
of inequality within the legal system.  It became easier for the soldiers to claim their case 
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was mishandled when there were widespread public outcries about the poor state of the 
Burkinabé justice system.    
 In order to calm down the mutinying soldiers, authorities released the arrested 
soldiers.  However this angered the justice department who went on strike to protest.  
Additionally, traders and shop owners whose merchandise had been looted or destroyed 
by the mutineers began to demonstrate.  At this point ‘the regime was faced with a 
multipronged protest which included the movement against impunity, traders, the justice 
department, and the army.’35  Before the government could resolve this problem, a 
separate mutiny broke out in Fada N’Gourma, approximately 200 km east of 
Ouagadougou. 
 Much like the Ouagadougou mutiny, which occurred just a week earlier, the 
soldiers in Fada N’Gourma protested a court ruling.  In this case the arrested soldier had 
been convicted of raping a minor.36  The soldiers fired weapons into the air and 
intimidated authorities into releasing their arrested comrade. Professor Yonaba argues 
that the release of the soldiers in Ouagadougou and Fada N’Gourma was a major setback 
for the rights of the Burkinabé people. Overruling the decision of the justice department 
due to the unruly behaviour of junior soldiers, further delegitimized the government who 
was viewed as extending the pattern of impunity for military personnel. 37  It showed that 
the law was selective, justifying the civilian accusations about the Justin Zongo case and 
other previous unresolved crimes. 
 From this point the mutinies extended to other regions of the country, with the 
most severe threat occurring on April 14 when the Presidential Guards (RSP) revolted.  
This was the first time this unit had been involved in a mutiny.38  They claimed their 
protest was over payment and housing allowances.  The mutiny quickly spread to 
soldiers at Camp Lamizana in western Ouagadougou.39  There were also widespread 
looting, car thefts, and reports of rape.40  The chaotic atmosphere made it difficult to tell 
if the crimes were committed by military personnel or civilians, however is appears both 
took part.  Media outlets shut down adding to the residents’ anxiety as they did not know 
what was going on. 
 12 
 President Compaoré’s response shows the severity of the situation.  Within a day 
of the RSP revolt he left the capital and took refuge in his hometown of Ziniare, 30 km 
north of the capital.41  Just one day later President Compaoré dissolved the government, 
appointed a new cabinet and Prime Minister, replaced the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, 
Air Force, and Police and named himself Minister of Defence.  
 Compaoré quickly gave into the demands of the RSP and a spokesperson for the 
RSP publicly reaffirmed the unit’s loyalty to the president.42  However, rather than calm 
the situation it seemed to inspire other units.   Media reports quote soldiers objecting to 
inequality between military units and demanding that their pay and bonuses be 
equivalent to that of the RSP.43  Soldiers in Tenkodogo, Kaya, and Po imitated earlier 
mutinies by firing weapons in the air, looting shops, seizing private vehicles and 
attacking the houses of senior officers.44 Within a month of the initial Ouagadougou 
revolt, the mutinies had spread to every region of the country with units from the Army, 
Air Force, and police taking part45   
 During this month of spreading mutinies, civilians were also taking to the streets 
in a continuation of the protests that began over Justin Zongo’s death and had escalated 
to economic and political demands for change.  At times civilians and military seemed 
united in their calls for increased wages but in other incidents civilians directly protested 
damage caused by the mutinies and criticized the government for not controlling the 
armed forces.46  On April 28 (two months after the start of the turmoil) the Prime 
Minister announced a series of changes in response to the widespread civilian and 
military demands.  Key changes included the elimination of the development tax, 
reduction in the salary tax, and salary increases in the public sector as well as promises 
to charge senior officials involved in corruption.  However, these changes only affected 
a minority of the population and did little for the bulk of the people who make a living 
from agriculture.47  Promises to increase subsidies on basic commodities had a wider 
reach across society and the protests became more sporadic.48 
 Although the government seemed to have made progress on the civilian front, the 
military continued to express its dissatisfaction.  New mutinies broke out in Po, Kaya, 
Dori, Tenkodogo, Dedougou, and Koupela in May 2011.49  It is difficult to tell how 
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exactly these mutinies were resolved but it is likely agreements were made over salary 
or other material complaints.   
 After months of dealing with unruly soldiers, the government reached its 
breaking point at the beginning of June when soldiers in Bobo Dioulasso joined the 
revolt.  Bobo Dioulasso is Burkina Faso’s second largest city and home to the second 
largest military base. The city has a large university student population and a reputation 
as a rebellious town.50 After three days of destructive behaviour by soldiers which shut 
down the city, Compaoré sent members of the RSP, the Dedougou paratroopers and 
gendarmerie to ‘forcibly disarm’ the mutineers.51   Officially the attack left 6 mutineers 
and one civilian dead.  However, according to several military sources, the number of 
military casualties was much higher.  Following the attack the government announced 
the dismissal of 566 soldiers, 217 of which were brought up on criminal charges.52   
 The counter-attack in Bobo Dioulasso put an end to the mutinies but in many 
ways further perpetuated internal military divisions and set the stage for 2014 and 2015.  
The RSP had long had a contentious relationship with the regular army and the attack in 
Bobo Dioulasso put them in direct opposition to the army.  Furthermore, while the RSP 
had also been involved in mutinies, no members of the RSP were among those 
dismissed.  This further increased the sense of injustice that was at the heart of much of 
the military discontent that triggered the mutinies. The poor relationship between the 
RSP and regular army was further apparent in 2015 when the RSP attempted a coup with 
no support from the army.  In this incident the situation was the reverse of 2011; the 
army attacked and ‘defeated’ the coup attempt by the RSP.  
 What is unusual about the Burkina Faso mutinies is not that they ended violently, 
but that they did not end violently sooner.  There are few cases in West Africa in which 
mutinies continued for such a long period before being forcibly put down. One 
explanation is that the government wanted to use all possible methods before resorting to 
violence.  One military interviewee explained that peaceful negotiation is ‘the Burkinabé 
way.’53  This may be part of the story as Burkina Faso does not have a history of civil 
war or armed rebellions and past coups and mutinies have been relatively non-violent.  
However, the massive scale of the mutinies alongside the widespread civilian protests 
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was also likely a reason Compaoré was reluctant to use physical force against mutineers.  
Additional violence could have spark more demonstrations or even lead to a 
collaborative expression of discontent between the military and civilian protestors.  
Compaoré had benefitted from the latter in 1983 and later became victim of the pattern 
in 2014.  In 2011 he attempted to avoid a larger uprising with concessions for both 
civilian protestors and mutineers.  
   
  
Tensions within the Ranks 
 
 Much like the ongoing civilian protests, the mutinies were fragmented.  There 
was no leader or unified demands. Soldiers explained that they found out about deals 
struck by mutineers in other parts of the country through cell phone calls to their friends 
at other bases, rather than through any centrally organized efforts.54  While there was no 
single list of grievances presented by the mutineers, interviews with soldiers from 
various units reveal common concerns across the junior ranks of the military.  
Media reported that the mutinies were sparked because soldiers had not been 
paid; however all soldiers that I spoke with stated that this was inaccurate.55  They 
explained that one of several grievances involved a more nuanced issue of living 
allowances.56  Soldiers are entitled to a salary and a living allowance and the living 
allowance is easier to manipulate.57  The living allowance goes towards housing and 
food, which is often provided by the military and thus not paid in full.  Soldiers 
perceived that they should be getting more/better food and housing for the amount that 
their living allowance is worth. There were also allegations that senior officers were 
taking part of this allowance for their own purposes.58 
The military respondents explained that the regular indiscipline in the military 
has its roots in pervasive corruption and favouritism within the armed forces. Numerous 
interviewees stated that the problems begin with the recruitment process, which they 
argued has become very personalized.  One military source went into great length about 
a concept within the Burkinabé military called ‘Command Lists.’  He explained  
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So say the military is recruiting 500 individuals.  The head 
of the army will get to submit 10 names, then the regional 
commander submits 10, then the base commander, and so 
on, even down to the local chief.  These individuals are 
hand selected based on their affiliation and do not have to 
pass the other requirements, such as the physical tests.  But 
those that have no affiliation must pass strict tests.  Then 
when they get to basic training, the trainers know who is 
from the list, they are concerned about being too harsh on 
those that were selected by top officers.  So those 
individuals get a pass again, while the others are treated 
very poorly.  Everyone understands the system and it 
creates major divides from the start.59   
 
Other military sources made similar accusations, one stated, ‘rich people send 
their sons and daughters to the military and no one can bother them.’60  Another soldier 
exclaimed ‘officers can bring their children into the military, this is a problem because 
their superiors are afraid to discipline them because they are the sons of their boss.’61  
Yet another soldier alleged, ‘there is favouritism in recruiting, they don’t see who is 
best, they select sons of officers.’62 The recruitment issue has become particularly 
relevant in recent years as Burkina Faso recruited 2,000 individuals between 2008 and 
2011.  This is a substantial number considering the entire force is between 7,000 and 
8,000 (not including the gendarmerie).63   
Soldiers also alleged that there is not a fair method of rewards and promotions 
within the military.  For example, one military source expressed anger that despite 
having the top aptitude score he was passed over for officer training by others who he 
claimed were connected but less qualified.64  Another raised specific concerns about the 
way individuals are selected for deployments.  He complained that peacekeepers are 
chosen from among the senior officers’ friends and relatives.65  Another military source 
backed this up by stating, ‘if you do not know someone, you will never be assigned to an 
important mission.’66  With Burkina Faso increasing its contributions to foreign 
missions, this is a concern that will likely continue if the hierarchy does not address it. 
  Underlying these complaints is distrust towards officers who the junior soldiers 
viewed as endorsing and perpetuating a system that they perceive as based on 
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favouritism. Interviewees were not shy to criticize senior officers, particularly.  One 
soldier, speaking particularly about the senior officers stated  
officers are taking advantage of their positions, driving big 
cars, living in big houses in Ouaga 2000 always going on 
foreign training opportunities, gaining more profit while the 
others are living like normal Burkinabé.67 The juniors work 
the most and gain the least, while the officers work the least 
and gain the most, it should be the opposite.  This creates a 
lot of frustration for privates and NCOs.68   
 
A junior soldier believed that most individuals got to a senior position through 
means other than merit, and therefore he explained that there is no respect for the senior 
officers among the rank and file.69  The officers appeared to recognize that they had no 
control over their subordinates.  When I asked soldiers where the officers were while the 
rank and file took to the streets, answers included ‘hiding’ and ‘they ran away.’  No one 
indicated that the individual officers attempted to regain their authority. 
 These detailed grievances and faults confirm findings by Mathieu Hilgers and 
Augustin Loada who assess that the mutineers ultimately wanted better governance of 
the defense sector and more transparency and accountability of the management of 
resources in the security sector.70  The numerous complaints of the soldiers were not 
new in 2011 but the broader sense of distrust and dissatisfaction towards the top 
authorities expressed in the demonstrations seemed to resonate with and inspire the 
mutineers.  As one military officer explained ‘The importance of the unrest beginning 
with civilian protests should not be underestimated, without them the soldiers probably 
wouldn’t have acted out.’71   
This pattern of mutinies occurring alongside civilian protests can be seen in 
many cases across the continent.72  It demonstrates the interconnections between junior 
soldiers and the civilian population. Much attention has been given, particularly within 
the media, to the often-antagonistic relationship between junior ranks and youth 
protestors.  Soldiers have often clashed with youth protestors and security personnel on 
university campus is an ongoing point of contention in Burkina Faso.73  Yet junior 
soldiers are also of the same peer group as many of the youth protestors and important 
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connections exist.  They share many of the same interests and often maintain personal 
links with urban youth and university students.  Many of the student protestors I 
interviewed were critical of the military but also willing to introduce me to their friends 
in the armed forces, whom they knew from their neighbourhoods growing up.  Although 
military hierarchies often try to separate soldiers from the civilian population through 
uniforms, grooming standards, and military housing, the reality is that there is often 
overlap in lifestyle, interests, and personal networks between soldiers and the civilians, 
especially youths.  These linkages help explain the way that soldiers came to draw 
inspiration from the protests.  However, it also shows the complexity of the relationship.  
Ideas expressed by civilian protestors, themselves divided, were not simply transferred 
to soldiers but instead reinterpreted in various ways by different groups of mutineers.  
Thus the crisis of 2011 expressed common themes but quite different and even 
contradictory demands.  
 
‘This is Just the Beginning’ 
 
 In response to the mutinies, the government made several changes within the 
armed forces.  Amongst the most high profile was the dismissal of the Chiefs of Staff of 
the Army, Air Force, and Police.  Sources explained that although the Army Chief of 
Staff in particular was unpopular, his removal did not placate the mutinying soldiers.74 
Rank and file soldiers are far too removed from the Chief’s of Staff to be largely 
effected by a shift in personnel at that level.  Furthermore, a military officer explained 
that the ‘fired’ senior officers were not actually removed from service, just rotated into a 
different position.75  Military interviewees acknowledged that there have been some 
immediate benefits from the mutinies.  Junior soldiers reported that their salaries have 
increased (along with civil servants) and that some of the food issues have been 
resolved.  The request to allow soldiers to purchase their own food, rather than have it 
provided by the military, was granted.   
A Burkinabé military source also noted that the government took measures to 
make it physically more difficult for soldiers to mutiny, or at least to cause such 
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widespread violence.  There was concern over how easily soldiers throughout the 
country were able to access ammunition.  Therefore, the ammunition is now more 
centralized, most secured at one base rather than spread throughout the number of 
smaller bases and outposts.  He claims that although soldiers still carry guns, few have 
any ammunition.76 
 High-level personnel changes and increased payments, along with the mass 
dismissals, did not address the systemic problems within the military.  One military 
source summed it up nicely by saying ‘the problem is deeper than just removing a 
person, it is the same structures, the same people and the same philosophy.’77  Another 
enlisted soldier also expressed concern that structural issues in the military persisted by 
noting ‘there is still a part of the army that cannot be touched.’ When I questioned who 
specifically he was referring to he responded “those that are closest to the President”, 
meaning the RSP.78 When asked about what changes they would like to see one soldier 
responded ‘a new generation of officers’ and another said, ‘we need new blood.’  Yet 
another military interviewee backed up these sentiments by explaining ‘we need new 
young officers with education, a new way of doing things, in one word we need new.’  
During interviews in 2012 both military and civilians had a strong sense that the 
crisis in 2011 was not fully resolved and more tension was yet to come. Some 
individuals made bold statements such as ‘to be sincere, this is just the beginning’ and 
‘the crisis is not behind us, it is in front of us.’79 A source within the Burkinabé military 
described the series of mutinies since the 1990s and pointed out that with each 
successive demonstration, the military has become more violent.  He said he is worried 
that if this pattern continues the next round could be devastating to the country.80  
Several other interviewees shared this opinion with responses such as ‘next time it will 
be worse’ and ‘if it happens again I think it will be a full revolution.’  In many ways 
these respondents accurately predicted what was to come in 2014.  The same desire for 
new blood, as expressed within the military, was seen in the widespread civilian calls for 
an end to Compaoré’s rule. 
 
 19 
Beyond the Barracks 
 
 Similar to the military interviewees, civilian informants expressed a sense of 
both accomplishment and reservations about the outcomes of the 2011 events.  Many 
commented on progress within the justice system, which was likely linked to several 
high profile cases against senior officials that were ongoing at the time.81  They also 
noted that charges were brought against officers involved in the death of Justin Zongo 
(the individual whose murder touched off the initial demonstrations).  Others 
commented on everyday changes such as reduced prices for food items and increases in 
salaries.  Despite acknowledging improvements, most did not feel that the reforms went 
far enough.  Many noted the initial decreases in commodity prices had crept back up and 
there had not been significant changes in employment opportunities.   
 In addition to these post-crisis changes, it is important to acknowledge that the 
military uprising also resulted in dozens of injured civilians, numerous reported rapes, 
and large-scale damage to shops and private residences. Between those that experienced 
the mutinies first hand and those that heard of it through the extensive local media 
coverage, one might assume that there would be a widespread negative opinions of 
soldiers amongst the civilian population. However, based on interviews this does not 
appear to be the case.  Numerous interviewees expressed the belief that although the 
violence enacted by the military was wrong, they were forced into the situation because 
they have no other way to express their complaints.  In the interviews it was clear 
individuals were referring to the ‘regular’ rank and file soldiers, not officers or members 
of the RS.  A sample of such comments include: 
They [soldiers] should be able to strike, our government 
does not allow the soldiers to strike. 
 
We are a democratic country, it is unfair that they [soldiers] 
cannot participate. 
 
Those soldiers, they were fighting to claim their rights too, 
even a soldiers needs to take care of his family, the 
hierarchy is the problem. 
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Many felt that the junior ranks of the military are poorly treated.  For example, a 
Burkinabé professor stated that he was not surprised by what happened because ‘those 
guys are abused, have no rights, they have bad living conditions, it is all they can do.’82  
Another academic furthered this point by stating, ‘all Burkinabé should be treated equal 
but the military are often treated badly and they don’t have their rights.’  He added that 
their actions should be condemned and they should have brought their case to the judge.  
He believes ‘all this happened because the military does not trust the justice system of 
Burkina Faso.’83 Despite nearly every civilian interviewee stating that they were 
shocked and worried by the violence unleashed by the mutinying soldiers, many were 
sympathetic to the soldiers’ causes and placed the overall blame on the government.   
These interviewee responses often framed the military revolts as part of wider 
tensions within the state.  This sense that the mutinies were of importance beyond just 
the military can be seen in a play, film, and music video that were each released about 
the revolt.  The film, titled “Le foulard noir” was created by the accomplished Burkinabé 
filmmaker, Boubacar Diallo.  It was screened nightly in various cities in Burkina Faso in 
spring of 2012 and was recommended to me on numerous occasions by both military 
and civilian interviewees.  The film portrays the mutinies in a measured light. Although 
there are scenes of graphic violence, there are also representations of friendships and 
relationships between the soldiers and civilians. It is a fictionalized story but includes 
pictures and footage from the actual mutinies. The presentation of mutinies in this forum 
is particularly noteworthy given that cinema holds an important and influential place in 
Burkina Faso.  Since the 1960s it has hosted the FESPACO film festival, which attracts 
large crowds of locals and international attendees.  The country has become known for 
its filmmakers, which is a source of national pride.  
Another cinematic recreation of the mutinies was the music video for “Voir 
sombrer ses fils” by the rap group Waga3000.  This group has both local and 
international appeal, with regular international tours and digital sales on many major 
music websites. The song and video focus on the issue of injustice and critiques both the 
military and politicians.  The musicians also situate the events in a wider historical 
context.  For example one of the rapper is wearing a shirt with the picture of Norbert 
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Zongo, the investigative journalist murdered in 1998.  Similar to “Le foulard noir,” the 
military is not portrayed as one-dimensional.  In some parts soldiers are shown attacking 
civilians and one scene implies rape.  Yet, the musicians are wearing parts of military 
uniforms and a final scene shows a soldier and civilian embracing. 
The popular media reproductions of the mutinies in some ways challenge the 
common notion of mutinies as internal military revolts which are often sparked by 
“basic and immediate needs” of soldiers.84 Instead there seemed to be a sense that the 
mutinies had relvance beyond the barracks. Many saw the soldiers’ efforts as one of 
wider proportions, which include many of the same themes of injustice, inequality, and 
corruption that effect the civilian population. This follows a historic pattern of 
interrelated civilian and military efforts to demand change.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The pattern of overlapping military revolts and popular protests in Burkina Faso 
demonstrates the linkages between civilians and rank and file soldiers.  Through an 
examination of the case of military revolts in 2011, the article argues for the need to 
view mutinies in the context of wider societal tensions.  The soldiers’ grievances 
extended far beyond material issues and suggested deep discontent within the ranks.  
Mutinying soldiers expressed a sense of injustice towards a system that they believed 
represented corruption and favouritism.  These problems are deeply ingrained in the 
military and affect recruitment, promotions, and selection of opportunities such as 
deployments.  The perception of corruption led to a lack of authority and legitimacy 
amongst the officers in the eyes of their subordinates.  The division among the ranks was 
demonstrated during the mutinies, in which only rank and file soldiers participated.   
Many of the grievances amongst the soldiers mirrored the civilian 
demonstrations and it is likely that soldiers drew inspiration for their revolt from the 
ongoing protests.  The crisis in Burkina Faso in 2011 also shows that the 
interconnectedness of popular protests and mutinies are complex and often 
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unpredictable.  The inspirations, actions, and outcomes of the demonstrations and revolts 
were influenced by each other, without ever directly aligning.   
The mutinies in Burkina Faso remained of interest to much of the civilian 
population because the soldiers’ actions were not seen as purely a military matter. The 
revolts had severe consequences on the civilian population but were seen by many as 
also a part of a wider struggle. Although Sankara’s vision of the military may not have 
been fulfilled, the consistent connections between military indiscipline and civilian mass 
actions suggests that the armed forces are very much a ‘component of the people’ in 
Burkina Faso. 
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